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FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW - DEFINITION OF A SECURITY
- THE SALE OF BUSINESS DOCTRINE REJECTED - FED-
ERAL JURISDICTION UNDER RULE lOb-5 WHEN FRAUD OC-
CURS IN CONNECTION WITH THE SALE OF A BUSINESS
STRUCTURED AS A SALE OF THE CORPORATE STOCKS.
Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982).
The Golden v. Garafalo I case involved the sale of a ticket broker-
age firm by defendant Garafalo to the Goldens. The attorneys for the
parties structured the transaction as a sale of stock in order to circum-
vent a nonassignment clause in the defendant's lease.2 The contract
provided that the plaintiffs pay an amount equal to the assets of the
business plus one hundred and eight thousand dollars. Several
months after assuming control of the business, the plaintiffs filed suit in
federal district court alleging that the defendant had made material
misstatements in both the negotiations and in the contract of sale.
They based their federal claim solely on rule lOb-5. 4 The district court
granted defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter juris-
diction.' Relying upon the sale of business doctrine, the court found
that the protective purposes of the federal securities laws were not im-
plicated because the economic reality of the transaction was the sale of
an entire business. Furthermore, the court held that since the transac-
tion did not involve a security, there was no cause of action under rule
lOb-5 and therefore no basis for federal jurisdiction. On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explicitly re-
jected the sale of business doctrine and reversed the decision of the
district court.6 The appellate court held that when there is a sale of an
instrument with the characteristics of stock, there is no need to examine
the economic reality of the transaction because the instrument is a se-
curity within the purview of the federal securities laws.
1. 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982).
2. Golden v. Garafalo, 521 F. Supp. 350, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 678 F.2d 1139
(2d Cir. 1982). Ultimately the Golden court determined that the reason for struc-
turing the transaction as a sale of stock was irrelevant.
3. 521 F. Supp. at 351.
4. Id at 352. Rule lOb-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national security exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1982). Under the federal claim, the plaintiffs sought rescis-
sion of the contract. They also sought compensatory and punitive damages and
equitable relief pursuant to four pendent state law claims.
5. Golden, 678 F.2d at 1140.
6. Id at 1144.
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Prior to the United States Supreme Court's 1975 decision in United
Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,7 the term "stock," as stated in the
definition of a security,8 was considered to be reasonably precise and
did not result in any significant confusion.' Thus, courts consistently
held the sale of a business represented by a sale of its stock to be a
securities transaction, and readily granted federal jurisdiction under
the securities laws.' The most recent of those cases, Occidental Life
Insurance Co. v. Pat Ryan & Associates, Inc., I held that as a matter of
law, the sale of stock representing the sale of a business warranted the
protection of the federal securities acts. 12 The Occidental Life court
further stated that every instrument used in a sales transaction need not
meet the definition of a security established by the Supreme Court in
SEC v. W.J Howey Co. "3 In Howey, the Court determined that an
investment contract was a security when it involved an investment in a
common enterprise with profits derived solely from the efforts of
others.'4 The court in Occidental Lfe found that when the sale of a
corporation is structured as a sale of stock "rather than a simple trans-
7. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
8. The definitional section of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides: "When
used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires: The term "security"
means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement. . . investment contract. . . or, in
eneral, any instrument commonly known as a 'security' . . . ." 15 U.S.C.
78c(10) (1976). Since Congress did not articulate the relevant economic criteria
for practical application of the definitional section, that task has fallen to the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission and the federal courts. See Seldin, When
Stock Is Not A Security" The "Sale of Business Doctrine" Under The Federal Se-
curities Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 637, 666 (1982).
9. Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Fed-
eral Securities, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 219, 222 (1974).
10. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Assocs., Inc., 496 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974); Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 870 (1961); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 320 F. Supp.
539 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Dauphin Corp. v. Davis, 201 F. Supp. 470 (D. Del. 1962).
Permitting federal jurisdiction in sale of business cases was apparently the general
rule in the pre-Forman era and, although objections were raised, there was no
judicial articulation of the sale of business doctrine as a means to avoid jurisdic-
tion. Indeed, prior to Forman, noted authorities warned practitioners that a sale
of a corporate business should be structured as a sale of assets in order to avoid
lob-5 liability and subsequent litigation in federal court. 4 A. BROMBERG & L.
LOWENFELS, SEcuRITirs FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 12.10(1) (1967 &
Supp. 1974).
11. 496 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974).
12. 496 F.2d at 1261 (quoting SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351
(1943)). OccidentalLife involved the sale by Occidental of its wholly-owned sub-
sidiary, an insurance company. The transaction was structured as a sale of all the
outstanding stock of the company. Prior to the sale, the capital of the company
was found to be substantially impaired. In addition the seller entered into agree-
ments with two states which required future purchasers of the business to requali-
fy. The buyer purchased without knowledge of the seller's mishandling of the
company. Id at 1259.
13. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
14. Id at 301.
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fer of assets . . . th[e] case . . . literally fits the definition of a
security.""5
The sale of business doctrine had its origins in United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 16 in which the Supreme Court considered
the status of an instrument called "stock." The Forman Court deter-
mined that shares of stock entitling a purchaser to lease an apartment
in a housing cooperative were not securities within the purview of the
federal securities laws. 7 The Court applied a two-step analysis and
determined that, first, the instruments had none of the characteristics of
ordinary stock.I8 Second, the Court found that they were not securities
in light of the Howey decision. 9 Courts that apply the sale of business
doctrine rely upon this second step of the Forman analysis to determine
whether an instrument described as "stock" is actually a security.20 In
so doing, they interpret Forman as a renunciation of the literal ap-
proach to defining securities as exemplified in Occidental Life. 21 These
courts hold, in effect, that an instrument possessing all the common
characteristics of stock is not a security, and will not be protected by
15. 496 F.2d at 1263. The Occidental court also stated: "Section 10(b) must be read
flexibly, not technically and restrictively. Since there was a "sale" of a security and
sincefraud was used "'n connection with" it, there is redress under § I 0(b), whatever
might be available as a remedy under state law. " Id at 1262 (emphasis in original)
(quoting Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6,
10-12 (1971)). The court in Occidental Life reasoned that application of section
10(b) cannot depend on whether the purchaser buys a small interest, a controlling
interest, or all of the stock of a corporation. 496 F.2d at 1263.
16. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
17. Id at 848-51. When an instrument possesses none of the significant characteris-
tics typically associated with a security, the name of the instrument is not disposi-
tive in determining whether it is a security.
18. Those characteristics are: (1) negotiability; (2) ability to be pledged or hypothe-
cated; (3) voting rights in proportion to the number of shares owned; (4) ability to
appreciate in value; and (5) right of the holder to receive dividends contingent
upon apportionment of profits. Id at 851.
19. Id at 851-58. The instrument failed to meet the Howey definition of a security
because there was no expectation of profits and the purchase involved a commod-
ity for personal consumption. See supra note 14 and accompanying text for the
Howey definition.
20. See, e.g., Anchor-Darling Indus., Inc. v. Suozzo, 510 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Pa. 1981);
Barsy v. Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. 11. 1981). It is notable that several com-
mentators have criticized the Howey formula because of its lack of precision. Cof-
fey, The Economic Realities of "Security" Is There a More Meaningful Formula,
18 WESTERN RESERVE L. REV. 367 (1967) (ambiguous); Hannan & Thomas, The
Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal Securities, 25 HAs-
TINGS L.J. 219 (1974) (applied restrictively without recognizing that it is merely a
statement of a result based on the facts of a particular case); Long, An Attempt To
Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24
OKLA. L. REV. 135 (1975) (misleading).
21. See Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1150-51 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 1017 (1981), which is the seminal case on the doctrine. See generaly Thomp-
son, The Shrinking Definition of a Security.- Why Purchasing Al of a Company's
Stock Is Not a Federal Security Transaction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 225 (1982).
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the securities laws unless all the requirements of the Howey test are
satisfied.
Typical of decisions relying on the sale of business doctrine, the
district court in Golden found that the stock purchased was not a secur-
ity because the purchaser gained personal control of the business.22
When one acquires one hundred percent or a controlling percentage of
the stock of a business, which he then manages, there is no reliance
upon the efforts of others so as to satisfy that element of the Howey
test.23
In addition to relying upon an interpretation of the Forman/
Howey cases, courts which apply the sale of business doctrine find sup-
port for their position in the commercial-investment dichotomy.24 The
dichotomy presumes a distinction between transactions of a primarily
commercial character and those of a primarily investment character.
When a transaction involves a transfer of control it is characterized as a
commercial, rather than an investment, transaction which does not
merit the shelter of the federal securities laws. Thus, the sale of busi-
ness doctrine has been applied to deny federal jurisdiction when the
plaintiff was the buyer or seller of as little as fifty percent of the stock of
a corporation.25 Such an individual is deemed an entrepreneur en-
gaged in a commercial transaction, rather than a passive investor, and
therefore not eligible to claim protection under rule lOb-5. 26 However,
the commercial-investment dichotomy causes problems in transactions
that involve less than one hundred percent of the stock of a business,
because an ad hoc decision is required to determine whether a transfer
of control has occurred.27
Critics of the sale of business doctrine, including the Securities and
Exchange Commission,28 contend that the Forman case is not disposi-
22. Golden, 521 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982).
23. 521 F. Supp. at 354-55; see also Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981).
24. See generally Thompson, The Shrinking Definition of a Security.- Why Purchasing
All of a Company's Stock Is Not a Federal Security Transaction, 57 N.Y.U. L.
Rlv. 225 (1982). The author submits that purchasers in sale of business cases are
buying for their own "consumption." Id at 243.
25. Oakhill Cemetery of Hammond, Inc. v. Tri-State Bank, 513 F. Supp. 885 (N.D.
Il. 1981) (purchaser of 50% of the company's stock was merely resuming control
of the business); Barsy v. Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (plaintiff was the
seller of 50% of the stock of a printing company). In both cases the courts found
an intent to engage in a commercial enterprise rather than an intent to make an
investment.
26. Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 203 (7th Cir. 1982).
27. Golden, 678 F.2d at 1146. In order to avoid this ad hoc decision-making, the
Seventh Circuit in Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982), established a
rebuttable presumption that one who has or who acquires more than 50% of the
common stock of a corporation is an entrepreneur rather than an investor. Id at
203.
28. While the federal courts are split on the issue, it is the position of the Securities
and Exchange Commission that when a sale of a business is represented by a sale
of the stock of the business, a security is involved. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the
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tive of transactions involving ordinary stock. They challenge Forman
as the basis of the doctrine because it concerned an instrument which,
although called stock, possessed none of the characteristics of ordinary
stock. The SEC and courts which refuse to apply the doctrine maintain
that since the federal securities laws define stock as a security, those
laws are applicable to any instrument that possesses the characteristics
of ordinary stock.29
In Golden v. Garafalo, 30 the Second Circuit examined previous
Supreme Court decisions3 and found that the determination of
whether an instrument was a security centered on the instrument itself,
without regard to the relative holdings of the parties or their inten-
tions.32 In contrast, the sale of business doctrine treats a particular in-
strument as a security for some purposes but not for others.3 3 The
Golden court noted that Forman and Howey, which form the basis of
the doctrine, both involved "unique or idiosyncratic instruments. 34
Hence, any language purporting to aply the economic reality test to
traditional securities is mere dictum. Furthermore, the court criti-
cized proponents of the doctrine for overlooking the first step of the
Forman analysis which focuses upon whether the instrument in ques-
tion could be classified as ordinary stock and therefore a security. The
Second Circuit asserted that if economic reality were the universal ju-
risdictional test, the Forman court would not have first examined
whether the shares in question were stock according to conventional
criteria. Therefore, the court concluded that Forman requires applica-
tion of the Howey test if, and only if, an instrument purporting to be
stock possesses none of the characteristics of stock.3 6
In addition, the Golden court found the application of the com-
mercial-investment dichotomy to be especially strained within the con-
Securities and Exchange Commission, Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.
1983). In Daily, plaintiffs purchased 100% of the stock of defendant's corporation
and later learned that the financial information provided to them in connection
with the sale was incomplete and misleading. Defendants failed to disclose the
company's high debt-equity ratio or that the business, a franchise truck dealer-
ship, was in violation of the franchisor's capital requirements.
29. E.g., Golden, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982); Miffin Energy Sources, Inc. v. Brooks,
501 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Titsch Printing, Inc. v. Hastings, 456 F. Supp.
445 (D. Colo. 1978). See supra note 18 for the characteristics of ordinary stock.
30. 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982).
31. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982); United Housing Found., Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
32. Golden, 678 F.2d at 1143-44.
33. For example, according to the doctrine, when a new manager purchases 100% of
the shares of a business from a number of stockholders, the federal securities laws
would protect the passive investors but not the new manager. Id at 1142.
34. Id at 1144.
35. Id
36. Id at 1145. Howey is of little help in determining the meaning of "specific words




text of corporate transfers. The court determined that purchasers of the
stocks of a business are investors if they intend to profit by reselling
their shares at a future date.37 Therefore, when a transfer of corporate
control is motivated by a hope for future capital gains, it is artificial to
classify such transactions as exclusively commercial. 38 Finally, the
Golden court noted that the securities acts have always been under-
stood to apply to transactions in shares of closely as well as publicly
held corporations, and to negotiated as well as market sales and
purchases of stock. Hence, the court found no basis for denying federal
jurisdiction in a case involving a negotiated sale of the stock of a
closely held corporation.39
Several basic flaws undermine the sale of business doctrine. First,
the validity of the doctrine hinges upon the Supreme Court's opinion in
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, I which is not dispositive
of the characterization of ordinary stock under the federal securities
laws.4 ' Second, proponents of the doctrine have failed to define a com-
pelling reason for ignoring Congress' express intent to include ordinary
stock as a security by specifically enumerating stock in the definitional
sections of the securities acts. Third, application of the doctrine results
in an inconsistency because it bars the federal claims of the entrepre-
neurs engaged in a transaction, but not those of parties to the same
transaction who are deemed passive investors. Finally, as a matter of
policy, parties who benefit by structuring a business sale as a securities
transaction should not be permitted to use the doctrine as a shield
against liability under federal law.
There was no question prior to Forman that an ordinary stock is a
security under the federal securities laws.42 Since the Forman Court
initially determined that the instrument in question was not on its face
a stock, the Court's analysis is clearly inapplicable to ordinary stock.
37. Id at 1146. In Golden, the court suggested that the sale of business doctrine is of
limited value insofar as it concludes that an intent to manage is determinative in
finding that a stock transfer is a sale of a business to an entrepreneur rather than a
sale of a security to an investor. Id at 1145. The court also pointed out that
mixed questions of law and fact, which exceed the scope of the doctrine, would
arise when shareholders are part-time managers, intervene sporadically in man-
agement, or when new investors, who intend initially to remain passive, are forced
into management roles. Id
38. Id at 1146.
39. Id at 1146-47.
40. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
41. Coffin v. Polishing Mach., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th Cir.) (Forman requires
application of Howey only when stock lacks "significant characteristics typically
associated with the named instrument"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); Mifflin
Energy Sources, Inc. v. Brooks, 501 F. Supp. 334, 335-36 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (For-
man does not require application of the economic reality test to shares which
possess the common features of stock); Titsch Printing, Inc. v. Hastings, 456 F.
Supp. 445, 449 (D. Colo. 1978) (Forman does not require application of the
Howey test to stock).
42. See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, the Golden court correctly characterized as dictum the lan-
guage in Forman which appears to support the sale of business doc-
trine.43 Forman simply created a two-step test to determine whether an
instrument purporting to be stock is, in fact, a security. The first step is
to determine whether the instrument in question bears the characteris-
tics of ordinary stock. If it does, the instrument is a security and further
inquiry is unnecessary. If it does not, an examination of the context of
the transaction is required. Thus, Forman is not authority for the
premise of the sale of business doctrine that all instruments must be
analyzed in terms of the Howey test for investment contracts.
Under the sale of business doctrine courts impose the Howey test
upon ordinary stock because they hold that whenever a business sale
involves a transfer of control, an examination of the context of the
transaction is required to determine whether the stock is, in fact, a se-
curity. Courts rely upon the words in the prefatory clause of the defini-
tional section of the Securities Exchange Act as statutory authority for
a presumption that ordinary stock is not a security unless it satisfies the
Howey test." Those words, "unless the context otherwise requires,"
are critical to the doctrine. Yet Forman ignored the phrase and there-
fore does not support the use of the prefatory clause to examine the
context of a sale of stock. While the legislative history of the federal
securities laws is virtually silent with regard to the definition of a secur-
ity, there is no apparent congressional intent to base the definition on
the context of the transaction rather than the instrument itself. In fact,
the prefatory phrase found in the original draft of the Securities Act of
1933 states, "unless the text otherwise indicates."45 This suggests that
the clause excepts from the definition only those instruments which the
43. See Golden, 678 F.2d at 1144.
44. See Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir.) (the prefatory phrase
demands a narrow reading of the statute and prevents a literal interpretation of
the definitional section), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981); see also Golden 678
F.2d at 1141 (under the sale of business doctrine, these words limit the inclusion
of instruments to those in which the "context" directly involves the protective
purposes of the Securities Acts). See supra note 8 for the applicable portion of the
act.
45. When the original bill for the Securities Act of 1933 was introduced in the House
of Representatives on March 29, 1933, the prefatory clause of the definitional sec-
tion stated: "That when used in this Act the following terms shall, unless the text
otherwise indicates, have the following respective meanings .... ." 3 J. EL-
LENBERGER & E. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF
1933 AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 Item 22 (1973) (emphasis
added).
While the sale of business doctrine deals with the definitional section of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the legislative history of the 1933 Act is signifi-
cant since it served as a model for the 1934 Act. Hannan & Thomas, The Impor-
tance of Economic Reality and Risk In Defining Federal Securities, 25 HASTINGS
L.J. 219, 220 n.6 (1974). Furthermore, the prefatory clauses are identical in the
two acts. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1976) with 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1976).
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text of the act explicitly excludes. 6 Therefore, since the text of the act
expressly includes ordinary stock, there is no basis for the presumption
that when a sale of a business occurs the context of the transaction
removes ordinary stock from its protection.
While the act limits the definition of a security through exemptions
for the purposes of reporting and registration, section 10(b) provides
protection against fraud in the purchase and sale of any security, re-
gardless of whether registration is required.47 The sale of business doc-
trine is an attempt to circumvent the plain and unambiguous language
of the statute for the purposes of rule lOb-5. Hence, the rejection of the
doctrine is not an attempt to expand the coverage of the federal securi-
ties laws, but merely to maintain the protection that has traditionally
been granted against fraud in connection with the purchase and sale of
ordinary stock.
Application of the sale of business doctrine to bar federal jurisdic-
tion results in inconsistent treatment of different parties involved in a
single transaction because it denies federal protection to entrepreneurs
but not to passive investors.48 One who buys or sells a controlling
block of the stock of a corporation is considered an entrepreneur. Thus
the element of control distinguishes entrepreneurs from investors.
However, the need to define control on a case-by-case basis cannot be
alleviated by the doctrine's presumption that a transaction involving
fifty percent or more of the stock of a corporation effects a transfer of
control. The sale of business doctrine neglects to consider any factors
used to define control.49 Rather, it considers only the percentage of
stock involved in the transaction, thus rendering the distinction be-
tween entrepreneurs and investors superficial at best.
Finally, equitable considerations mandate that liability under rule
lOb-5 exist when fraud occurs in connection with a sale of stock, de-
46. Frederiksen and its progeny assert that the prefatory phrase requires an examina-
tion of the context of the transaction. One authority submits that courts which
take this approach are practicing sophistry. LONG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
STATE SECURITIES (BLUE SKY) REGULATION 11-12 (4th ed. 1981). Professor
Long contends that the introductory clause means that under certain conditions a
word used in the statute itself may be given a different meaning, depending upon
the context in which the word is used. Id
47. The definition is interpreted more broadly for the purposes of antifraud than for
registration. I A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODI-
TIES FRAUD § 4.6 (1967 & Supp. 1974); see also Dillport, Restoring Balance to the
Definition of a Security, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 99, 122-23 (1982).
48. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
49. The difficulty of defining control has become apparent in cases dealing with the
issue of whether general partnerships or joint ventures are securities. See, e.g.,
Pawgan v. Silverstein, 265 F. Supp. 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Williamson v. Tucker,
632 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1980). Factors which are important in determining whether
control exists are: distribution of power among the parties over the interest in-
volved; experience, knowledge, and ability to make intelligent decisions; and de-
pendence upon some unique ability of another. Williamson v. Tucker, 632 F.2d
579, 599 (5th Cir. 1980).
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spite the fact that a sale of a business has been effected. The sale of
business doctrine permits parties to enjoy the benefit of choosing the
structure of the transaction without accepting the concomitant liability
under federal law.5" Individuals victimized by fraud in connection
with the sale of a security have a bona fide federal claim to assert.
Thus, they are necessarily entitled to federal jurisdiction.5
Currently, there is a lack of uniformity in federal judicial adminis-
tration due to the conflict which exists over the sale of business doc-
trine. 2 Unless Congress acts to change the federal statutory definition
of a security, or the Supreme Court agrees to decide the issue,53 the
conflict will continue to foster uncertainty as to whether the sale of all
50. A transfer of a business may take place by a sale of stock, a sale of assets or by
merger. J. MCGAFFEY, BUYING, SELLING AND MERGING BUSINESSES 1 (1979).
Among the reasons for structuring the sale as a securities transaction is the avoid-
ance of real estate taxes when real estate of substantial value is involved. Id at
25. Additionally, a stock transaction dispenses with the necessity of compliance
with the bulk sales statute, reduces the number of closing papers and eliminates
third party consents to the transfer. 1 BUSINESS ACQUISITIONS § 5.201b (J. Hertz
& C. Bailer, eds. 2d ed. 1981). The SEC analogizes the sale of business doctrine to
an argument for denying the protections of the bulk sales provisions of Article 6
of the Uniform Commercial Code where a business sale is structured as a sale of
assets simply because it could have been structured as a sale of securities. Amicus
Curiae Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Daily v. Morgan, 701
F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1983).
51. Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising under rule lOb-5. 4
A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD
§ 11.1 (1967 & Supp. 1974).
52. The sale of business doctrine has been adopted in the Seventh, Tenth, and Elev-
enth Circuits. See King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342 (11th Cir. 1982); Canfield v.
Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981); Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d
1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981); Chandler v. Kew, Inc. [1979
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,965 at 96,053 (D. Colo. Dec. 4,
1975), aft'd, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,966 at 96,053
(10th Cir. Apr. 19, 1977). To date, the Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits
have granted federal jurisdiction under rule lob-5 when the sale of a business is
structured as a sale of stock. See Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1983);
Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982); Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d
31 (3d Cir. 1979); Coffin v. Polishing Mach., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979). Lower federal courts that have refused to apply the
doctrine and grant federal jurisdiction are: Mifflin Energy Sources, Inc. v.
Brooks, 501 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Titsch Printing, Inc. v. Hastings, 456 F.
Supp. 445 (D. Colo. 1978); Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Pa.
1976). Those which have denied federal jurisdiction under the doctrine are:
Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 522 F. Supp. 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Oakhill
Cemetery of Hammond, Inc. v. Tri-State Bank, 513 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Ill. 1981);
Anchor-Darling Indus., Inc. v. Suozzo, 510 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Barsy v.
Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Zilker v. Klien [1981 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,992, at 91,096 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Dueker v. Turner
[1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,386, at 97,535 (N.D. Ga.
1979); Bula v. Mansfield [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,964, at 96,051 (D. Colo. 1977).
53. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Frederiksen, Coffin, and Occidental
Life cases. All three cases concerned the question of whether federal jurisdiction
exists under the federal securities laws in the sale of business cases.
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the stock of a business, or even a controlling share, constitutes a secur-
ity. Ultimately, the statutory maxim that courts give effect to the plain
and unambiguous language of a statute54 must outweigh the competing
policy that lurks behind the sale of business doctrine - that of clearing
the federal dockets.
Donna B. Imhoff
54. 2 A. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01 (1973 & Supp. 1982).
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